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USS Monitor BB-76 Arsenal Ship by bagera3005 USS Monitor BB-76 Arsenal Ship by bagera3005
USS Monitor BB-76 Arsenal Ship
Arsenal Ship

Overview

Arsenal ship was a joint Navy / DARPA program to acquire a moderate cost, high firepower demonstrator ship with low manning as soon as possible. The Arsenal Ship was planned to restore the naval support of the land battle, the modern day equivalent of the firepower that battleships provided during World War II and in Korea. The plan was to produce the demonstrator ship for initial operational capability (IOC) by the year 2000. Based on successful demonstration, a total force of four to six Arsenal ships would be funded. The goal was to develop an Arsenal Ship (AS) functional design by the end of FY97. This timeline from concept design (FY96) through fabrication (FY00) represented half the development time of previous naval vessels of this complexity. The Arsenal Ship would contains four times the VLS cells found on a CG-52 class ship, have a fixed unit sailaway price of $450 million, and a life-cycle cost 50% less than that of a naval combatant.

But in early 1997 the House National Security Committee concluded that the Arsenal Ship and the SC-21 were two separate major warship development programs, and that the cost of carrying out two such programs would be unaffordable, while the requirement for both had been validated by the Secretary of Defense. On 24 October 1997 the House-Senate conference committee on the FY1998 Defense Authorization Bill on refused additional funding for the Arsenal Ship. With only $35 million appropriated, the Navy needed an additional $115 million to sustain the program. That day the Secretary of the Navy announced that the program would not be pursued. Some of the design work has been incorporated into the SC-21 and DD-21 program. On 01 December 1997 the National Defense Panel report criticized the cancellation of the Arsenal Ship, noting that the ship could have reduced the need for aircraft carriers.
The Arsenal Ship was developed initially as a demonstration program to provide a large increase in the amount of ordnance available to ground- and sea-based forces in a conflict, particularly during the early days. The Navy envisioned that the ship would have a large capacity of different missiles, including Tomahawk and Standard, and space for future extended range gun systems. The ship could also have a sea-based version of the Army Tactical Missile System. This ship could greatly increase capabilities in littoral operations to conduct long-range strike missions, provide fire support for ground forces, defend against theater ballistic missiles, and maintain air superiority.

The Arsenal Ship has the potential to provide substantial fire support to a variety of missions in regional conflicts without the logistics burden of transporting both delivery systems and ammunition to the shore and forward areas. The Arsenal Ship is expected to carry a large number of VLS cells but without the sophisticated command and control and radar equipment found on Aegis-equipped ships.

The ships would be theater assets that will operate under the authority of the joint Commanders-In-Chief (CINCs) and receive their targeting along with command and decision information from other assets. This ship will rely on other military assets, including surface combatants, to provide the targeting information and connectivity necessary to launch its weapons. The Arsenal Ship would server as the magazine for a distributed sensor network. A unique aspect to the Arsenal Ship is that all the command and decision functions would be made off board. Return to Top

Thus, the Arsenal Ship will not be fitted with long range surveillance or fire control sensors, but will be remotely controlled via robust data links. The data links will be secure, redundant and anti-jam in order to provide high reliability in the connectivity of the Arsenal Ships in high jamming operational scenarios. The overall program is an attempt to leverage the significant joint investment in Link 16 and CEC. Early in arsenal ship's life this control will be exercised through an Aegis platform. As the theater connectivity matures, the Arsenal Ship would accommodate a more robust set of controls from a wide variety of sources that would include JSTARS aircraft, AWACS or an E-2 with Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and, a soldier or a Marine on the ground or a command post ashore. This concept allows for remote missile selection, on-board missile initialization and remote launch orders, and provides remote "missile away" messages to the control platform.

The ship would have the equivalent ordnance—about 500 vertically launched weapons from a wide variety of the military’s inventory—of about four or five Aegis cruisers and destroyers. Employing the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) “remote magazine” launch concept, the arsenal ship would provide additional magazine capacity for Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) and Air Supremacy missiles.

The Navy envisioned the ship to have a small crew (possibly less than 50 members) and be highly survivable. Associated with minimizing ship costs and manning is the planned reliance on passive survivability, so that it would be very difficult for the Arsenal Ship to be hit by modern weapons. This may be achieved by a combination of reducing the signatures of the ship and the tactical use of countermeasures. If the ship is hit by a missile or a torpedo, the design would insure that the magazines are not violated. Finally, the hull would be sized and designed such that, even if the ship encounters a large torpedo or mine, the ship won't sink.

The Navy planned to maintain the Arsenal Ship forward deployed in major overseas regions for extended periods by rotating the ship’s crew and returning the ship only for major maintenance and overhauls. This plan would allow the Navy to use fewer Arsenal Ships to maintain overseas presence than if the ships were deployed routinely from the United States and permit their early availability in a conflict. Additionally, if the Arsenal Ship concept proves successful and within its cost projections (around $500 million for construction of each ship), DOD and the Navy may be able to retire or forego purchases of some assets, such as aircraft carriers, surface combatants, ground-based launchers, or combat aircraft. Return to Top
The Arsenal Ship Program's acquisition approach represented a major departure from the way Navy ships have been acquired in the past. The program turned the systems development process over to industry at its earliest stage and challenges industry to develop and design the optimum mix of performance capabilities which can be accommodated within production and life-cycle affordability constraints. In an effort to optimize streamlined technical and business approaches, the program used DARPA's Section 845 authority to conduct prototype development and acquisition experiments outside normal constraints of the Federal Acquisition Regulations.

Experience during the Arsenal Ship Project showed that to achieve a design balanced between cost and performance, a significant amount of interchange was required among subject experts, analysts, and the technical personnel developing the system and functional designs. Additionally, subject experts from outside of the team were used to assure critical performance requirements were understood and satisfied. However, because of the limitations on access applied during the Arsenal Ship Project, achieving the design balance became quite difficult.

In July 1996, DARPA awarded each of five industry teams $1 million Phase I agreements under full and open competition. Since that time, the five teams performed various trade-off studies and developed their initial Arsenal Ship design concepts based upon the governmentÕs Ship Capabilities Document and the Concept of Operations. The Phase I Arsenal Ship Concept Designs, in conjunction with the three successful offeror's Phase II proposals, formed the basis for the Phase II selection and were deemed as providing the best value to the government.

In early 1996 the program was redesignated the Maritime Fire Support Demonstrator (MFSD). The new effort broadened the scope to insert technologies into the demonstrator in preparation for risk reduction for SC-21. The MFSD was to be an at-sea technology testbed for the SC-21, the next-generation CVX aircraft carrier, and other future ships. Return to Top

In Phase II, which lasted one year, three industry teams continued to develop their concept designs into functional designs consisting of an integrated engineering and cost baseline for the Arsenal Ship Program. On 10 January 1997 DARPA selected three industry teams for Phase II of the Arsenal Ship Program. The three selected industry teams were each awarded $15 million modifications to their existing Phase I Arsenal Ship agreements. The three Phase II industry teams were:

* General Dynamics, Marine/Bath Iron Works, Bath, Maine, Team Leader, with: General Dynamics, Marine/Electric Boat, Groton, Conn.; Raytheon Electronic Systems, Lexington, Mass.; and Science Applications International Corp., McLean, Va.
* Lockheed Martin, Government Electronic Systems, Morrestown, N.J., Team Leader, with: Litton Industries/Ingalls Shipbuilding, Pascagoula, Miss.; and Newport News Shipbuilding, Newport News, Va.
* Northrop Grumman Corporation, Sykesville, Md., Team Leader, with: National Steel and Shipbuilding Co., San Diego, Calif.; Vitro Corp., Rockville, Md.; Solipsys, Columbia, Md.; and Band Lavis & Associates, Inc., Severna Park, Md.

After Phase II, DARPA planned to select one industry team to enter into Phase III, with the Navy to award an MFSD design and construction contract to one of the three Arsenal Ship teams in January 1998. During that phase, the industry team chosen would complete its detail design and construct an Arsenal Ship Demonstrator, as well as provide an irrevocable offer to construct five additional Arsenal Ships and convert the Arsenal Ship Demonstrator into a fully operational asset in the production phase (Phase V). Phase IV consists of performance testing and a fleet evaluation. The value of the research and development portion (Phases I-IV) of the program was approximately $520 million.
Specific objectives to be demonstrated included the ability to perform the operational mission for 90 days; architecture, communications, and datalink functions capable of satisfying the AS concept of operations; and the capability for remote launch of strike, area air warfare, and fire support weapons. The planned test program will include a salvo launch of up to three Tomahawk missiles in 3 minutes; a single SM2 launch using the AS as a remote magazine for a cooperative engagement capability ship, a single Tomahawk launch using the AS as a remote magazine for air-directed and shore-based targeting, and a single weapon launch from a VLS cell in support of a naval surface fire control mission digital call for fire.
Programmed DTO Funding ($ millions) Return to Top
PE Project FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
0603763E MRN-01 15.0 47.0 50.0 36.0 22.0 0 0
Total S&T 15.0 47.0 50.0 36.0 22.0 0 0
0603852N* S2294 25.0 141.0 90.5 80.2 11.4 0 0
Total 40.0 188.0 140.5 116.2 33.4 0 0
Specifications Return to Top
Armament 500-cell Vertical Launch System (VLS)
Tomahawk Land-Attack Missiles (TLAMs)
Army Tactical Missile System
Crew ~~ 50; designed to be highly automated
Design Low radar signature ("stealthy")
double hull
possible length 500-800 feet
Estimated Number Six vessels
Cost $500-800 Million each
missiles will cost ~~$500 million
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:iconfirevalkyrie:
Firevalkyrie Featured By Owner Feb 26, 2014  Hobbyist General Artist
Azipods are usually tractor propellers rather than pushers - a tractor propeller runs in smooth water, making it more efficient and less prone to cavitating.
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:iconbagera3005:
bagera3005 Featured By Owner Feb 26, 2014  Professional Interface Designer
if i had my way it be a caterpillar drive
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:icondeer-hunter01:
Deer-Hunter01 Featured By Owner Oct 6, 2013
Love your ships.

You are posting pics of navy ships that have been proposed but never built for one reason or other.  How do you design your ships? That I would like to know.
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:iconbagera3005:
bagera3005 Featured By Owner Oct 6, 2013  Professional Interface Designer
CAD
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:iconryuukei8569:
Ryuukei8569 Featured By Owner Aug 31, 2013
Yeah, but you know that the navy will never give up on its supercarriers, and something as archaic and old as a battleship will never work anymore :iconimsarcasticplz:
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:iconfirevalkyrie:
Firevalkyrie Featured By Owner Feb 26, 2014  Hobbyist General Artist
The Navy really wanted the arsenal ship, but ended up not being able to make a good case for a ship mounting hundreds of VLS cells that couldn't do proper damage control in the event of being hit. In any event, the converted Ohio-class SSGNs now perform the mission of the arsenal ship and are much safer (the Ohio is nigh-undetectable at any real distance).
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:iconryuukei8569:
Ryuukei8569 Featured By Owner Mar 21, 2014
It seems to me that the only real reason the Navy hasn't managed to be able to build either an arsenal ship or a true guided missile battleship, is that their main purpose would be to throw down so many missiles that it could easily wipe out entire air wings by itself, or throw down enough area defense missiles to stop a massed missile attack from a bunch of missile boats, which neither of these threats have shown up in sufficient number to justify the cost. Although, a 50,000 ton battleship, even if it was equipped with a warship version of chobalm armor used by modern main battle tanks, would still in all likeliness cost about a third to half that of an aircraft carrier wing and the carrier. Carriers have gotten retardedly  expensive and over sized. Of course, with railgun technology expected to show up within the next couple of decades, the navy is already planned warships around the weapon, the battleship may make a come back anyway, especially if it is merged with laser based defensive weapons as well. Such a ship would be utterly immune to guided missile attacks, and really the only threat to that type of warship would be submarines. But the US navy also happens to be developing a torpedo designed to shoot and destroy other torpedoes to.
Unfortunately the main problem with Ohio's is that right now, they can only carry tomahawks, which because of the missiles slow speed, they are virtually useless against other warships. And Ohio's cannot contribute to the air defense of a battlegroup, where as this would be the primary mission of a arsenal ship or BBG, is air defense and anti-missile defense. On top of that Ohio's aren't the best option for defending against other subs either. That's what the Hunter Killer subs are for. The only reason really that the Ohio's where even converted for this purpose in the first place, was the fact that the conversion costs where not overly high, and the Ohio's where already available for the task. But it would have not had the same mission as an Arsenal ship.
However, a properly designed guided missile battleship would be a ship which its main purpose would have been to wipe out a carrier battle group, or at least the air wing. as world War 2 proved, carriers are worthless should their air wings be destroyed, and the Japanese found that one out the hard way. A Proper BBG would be designed to throw down enough AA missiles to wipe out an air wing, have enough armor protection, so that if one or two anti ship missiles does get through its own defenses, that it can still continue its mission, and then have enough anti-ship missiles left over to at least take out a few of the carriers escorts, if not the carrier itself. But a ship like that would do best if it also had submarines aid in getting rid of the carrier escorts, while the battleship eliminates any submarine hunter aircraft that may threaten the subs.
However, the biggest mistake that the Navy ever made was going with completely unarmored ships. At least having some armor, forces an opponent to design its missiles to be armor piercing, and such missiles wont inflict as much overall damage, as a pure high explosive missile does to an unarmored target. So even if you cant keep a missile from fully penetrating, at least the armor will prevent one or two missiles that will likely get through defensive fire, from being catastrophic hits. Yeah, the ship would still be significantly damaged, but better damaged than on the bottom of the ocean.
Armor is one of the reasons why the sov's actually nicknamed the Iowa's, the cockroach battleship, because modern antiship missiles, particularly soviet ones, where all high explosives, and had no armor piercing capability, and as such where worthless against the Iowa's, on top of the fact that modern submarine launched torpedoes are not a powerful as world war 2 ones, and as such, would not have been able to beat the Iowa's torpedo's protection
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:icona10jockey:
A10Jockey Featured By Owner Jul 31, 2013  Hobbyist General Artist
Is that one of the currently Prototype Rail Guns I spot on the bow?
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:iconbagera3005:
bagera3005 Featured By Owner Jul 31, 2013  Professional Interface Designer
yes
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:icona10jockey:
A10Jockey Featured By Owner Jul 31, 2013  Hobbyist General Artist
Nice, not only will they not see it coming, they won't hear it until it hits them too.
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